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 OPINION 
                     
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This asbestos-related personal injury action was tried 
to a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff in excess of two million dollars.  On 
application by counsel, the district court granted plaintiff 
delay damages in the amount of $ 520,684.  In these consolidated 
appeals, we are called on to determine whether the district court 
abused its discretion by denying defendant's challenge for cause 
of two jurors who allegedly evidenced bias against the defense.  
Additionally, we are called upon to determine whether the 
district court committed an error of law by: (1) allowing 
plaintiff to introduce into evidence the prior testimony of an 
out of court expert witness from an unrelated state court action; 
(2) permitting plaintiff to introduce the interrogatory responses 
of a co-defendant who settled with the plaintiff prior to trial; 
(3) awarding plaintiff delay damages pursuant to Rule 238 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 
  
 Because we conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause of two 
jurors during voir dire, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages 
and liability.1  Since it is likely that the hearsay issues and 
the issue of delay damages may arise again during the new trial, 
we deem it appropriate to offer the district court guidance.  On 
these subjects, we conclude that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in allowing the introduction of hearsay evidence, 
but did not err in ruling that delay damages would be permitted 
when delay was caused by a judicial stay for which the plaintiff 
was not responsible. 
 
 I. Factual and Procedural History 
 Alfred Kirk ("decedent"), a retired painter, died on 
July 5, 1988 at the age of 65 from malignant asbestos-induced 
mesothelioma.  Mrs. Sarah Kirk ("Kirk"), suing on behalf of 
herself and her deceased husband's estate, filed this diversity 
action against eight defendants, including Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corporation ("Owens-Corning").2  Kirk alleged that her 
                     
1
.  Defendant also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying: (1) defendant a fair opportunity to prove 
the liability of a settled co-defendant by denying defendant's 
request for a continuance to subpoena product identification 
witnesses and (2) defendant's request for a new trial on the 
grounds of excessiveness of the verdict.  Because of our decision 
to reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a 
new trial on the issue of damages and liability, we need not 
address these arguments.   
2
.  Of these eight defendants, four were bankrupt at the time of 
trial.  Of the four remaining defendants, Kirk settled with 
  
husband's mesothelioma was caused by exposure to dust from 
asbestos products during his employment at the New York Shipyard 
in Camden, New Jersey, during the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
 By Order dated July 29, 1991, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") transferred all pending federal 
asbestos personal injury actions to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Pursuant to the MDL Panel's Order, all federal 
asbestos cases were stayed until the summer of 1993. 
 On December 13, 1993, the trial (which was reverse-
bifurcated) began with issues of medical causation and damages.  
At the conclusion of this phase of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Estate of Alfred Kirk for $ 1.2 million 
and in favor of Sarah Kirk for $ 810,000.  The liability phase of 
the trial commenced several days later before the same jury that 
had previously heard the damages phase.  At the conclusion of the 
liability trial, the jury returned a verdict against Owens-
Corning.  The jury also found that the decedent was not exposed 
to dust emitted by any asbestos-containing product manufactured 
by co-defendant Garlock, Inc. ("Garlock"). 
 Following the jury verdict, Owens-Corning moved for a 
new trial alleging several trial errors.  This application was 
denied by the district court.  Kirk filed an application for 
(..continued) 
Garlock, Inc., GAF Corporation, and Owens-Illinois prior to 
trial.  Kirk also previously filed an asbestos-related lawsuit in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Pittsburgh Corning 
Corporation, H.K. Porter Company, Inc., and Southern Textile 
Corporation.  Of these defendants, two were bankrupt and Kirk 
settled with Pittsburgh Corning prior to trial.   
  
delay damages pursuant to Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which the district court granted in the amount 
of $ 520,684.  Owens-Corning appeals from both the judgment and 
the award of delay damages. 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court made 
several errors at trial which unfairly prejudiced it during the 
damage and liability phases of the trial, and that the district 
court improperly denied its post-verdict motion for a new trial.  
Finally, Owens-Corning claims that delay damages should not have 
been awarded to Kirk, because the delay was caused by the 
plaintiff filing simultaneous federal and state court actions 
and/or caused by the MDL order staying all asbestos cases, and 
was not caused by any bad faith on the part of Owens-Corning.  We 
will address each of these arguments seriatim. 
 The district court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 as the judgment entered was a final order.   
 
 II.  Challenge for Cause of Jurors 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to strike for cause two prospective jurors (juror # 251 
and juror # 45) who defendant argues revealed considerable 
potential bias against it during voir dire.  We review for abuse 
of discretion a district court's decision regarding a motion to 
dismiss a juror for cause. United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 
1284 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1367 
(1993) (citing United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (3d 
  
Cir. 1986) (the factual determination by the district court 
whether a juror can serve impartially is entitled to special 
deference when reviewed on appeal)). 
 Because the trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility and demeanor of the prospective jurors, 
"district courts have been awarded ample discretion in 
determining how best to conduct the voir dire."  Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Rosales-Lopez v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1635 (1991)).  
In determining whether a particular juror should be excused for 
cause, our main concern is "whether the juror holds a particular 
belief or opinion that will `prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.'"  Salamone, 800 F.2d at 1226 (citing 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 
(1985)).  "A juror is impartial if he or she can lay aside any 
previously formed `impression or opinion as to the merits of the 
case' and can `render a verdict based on the evidence presented 
in court.'"  Polan, 970 F.2d at 1284 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1643 (1961)).  However, the 
district court should not rely simply on the jurors' subjective 
assessments of their own impartiality.  See Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 
710 (district court relied too heavily on jurors' assurances of 
impartiality); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) (though a juror swears 
that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the 
case on the evidence, a juror's protestation of impartiality 
  
should not be credited if other facts of record indicate to the 
contrary).  
 Owens-Corning argues that prospective juror # 251 
should have been struck for cause because he worked with 
asbestos-containing products for many years and indicated during 
voir dire that he was leaning in favor of the plaintiff.  Kirk 
argues that this prospective juror was properly placed on the 
jury because when questioned by both the district court and 
counsel whether he could render a fair and impartial verdict, the 
prospective juror responded in the affirmative. 
 We are troubled by the fact that a district judge, 
despite assurances of impartiality, allowed a prospective juror 
to serve in a mesothelioma case when the juror's background 
raised serious questions as to his ability to serve impartially.3  
                     
3
.  Relevant portions of the voir dire of prospective juror # 251 
are as follows: 
 
Juror 251:   Well, two uncles had cancer, they were mechanics. 
Our union did a study on their members.  I am a 
mechanic, and it was like 97 percent of them 
tested had some problem with asbestos.  I have 
eaten a lot of it over the years brakes, clutches 
up until gets in the air hose, blows it out, you 
spit black dirt for two days. 
 . . . .  
 
Mr. Kristal (counsel for Kirk): Do you think that will affect   
your ability to listen to the 
evidence and be fair to both 
sides in this case? 
 
Juror 251:   Well I could only try to be fair is all I could 
say.  I guess in a way I got to be a little one 
way, I'm probably high on the priority list 
myself.  I've been a mechanic since 1957, up until 
when they stopped using it, you know, you took a 
  
(..continued) 
clutch out of a truck, hit it with the air hose 
and the whole shop is black. 
 . . . . 
 
Mr. Kristal:   If I didn't prove my case, or show that Mr. Kirk 
didn't have asbestos disease or I was unable to   
   show Owens-Corning Fiberglas was liable, 
would you be able to return a verdict against my 
client? 
 
Juror 251:   I wouldn't have any problems at all. 
 
Mr. Kristal:   [I]f I had proven the case, would you be able to 
find in favor of my client? 
 
Juror 251:   I might lean the other way because I have been 
there.  I know a lot of members who have been down 
that road, you know. 
 
Mr. Kristal:   Can you put [your past experience with asbestos] 
behind you and decide this case on what you hear 
in the courtroom from the witness stand and follow 
the Court's instructions? 
 
Juror 251:  I believe I could. 
 
Mr. Hewitt (counsel for Owens-Corning): Your two uncles had   
        
cancer? 
 
Juror 251: Yes. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:  Do you believe those cancers were related to 
asbestos? 
 
Juror 251:  I don't know.  They both had lung cancer. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:   Were they around asbestos? 
 
Juror 251:   Mechanics the same as I am, both smoke, so it's  
anybody's guess. 
 
App. 68-70. 
 
The Court:   He thinks he has asbestos coursing through his   
     system. 
 . . . . 
 
  
(..continued) 
The Court:   I just want to clarify in my own mind, you have 
been exposed to the brake linings and flakes from 
brake linings? 
 
Juror 251:   Yes. 
 
The Court:   For many years now? 
 
Juror 251:   Yes, sir. 
 
The Court:   And you think that probably asbestos fibers made  
their way in through your own system because when 
you had the air hose -- 
 
Juror 251:   You see our Local, I am a member of the Local, and 
when all this asbestos problem came out, the Union 
started testing some of the older members.  It was 
like they finally knocked it off like 97 percent 
of the people tested, tested positive for 
asbestos.  And back then, we didn't know nothing 
about it.  You took brakes off the truck, took the 
air hose blew it off, disk, clutch, all asbestos, 
and I said yesterday, I probably had eaten a 
couple of pounds of it, and I have never been 
tested for it, but I have been subject to it. 
 
The Court:   If you are on this case you would be deciding 
certain questions, concerning somebody who died of 
asbestos exposure, how much money to award.  Do 
you think because of your own personal experience 
perhaps to a certain extent because of your 
uncles, you are not sure of the cause of the 
death, whether cigarettes or something to do with 
asbestos, do you think you could be fair or would 
you be inclined -- 
 
Juror 251:   Like I said, most of what I seen has been against 
it.  I would have to sit and listen to the case.  
If the one attorney can prove that it wasn't, I 
could handle that.  But at this point right now I 
only know the one side of it. 
 
The Court:   The way it's going to be, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof, not the defendant.  And do you 
think you could decide the case fairly or do you 
think because of your own personal experiences you 
would be sort of caught up in it and tend to favor 
the plaintiff? 
 
  
Specifically, we note the following facts which raise substantial 
questions of the potential bias of juror #251: (1) during the 
course of his work history he had "probably eaten a couple of 
pounds of [asbestos]"; (2) he was a union shop steward for 35 
years and received one-sided literature from the union regarding 
asbestos; (3) he believed that 97% of the older workers in his 
local union had tested positive for asbestos in their system; (4) 
he had two uncles who died of lung cancer and although they were 
cigarette smokers, they had been exposed to asbestos during the 
(..continued) 
Juror 251:   I think I could do it fairly.  I have been a shop 
steward for 35 years.  Lots of time I have to go 
against the company.  That didn't sit too well but 
I think I could sit and listen to the facts. 
 . . . . 
 
Juror 251:   I think I could weed through it.  Most of the    
information I have has been from the side of the 
Union coming with the asbestos.  And really, it's 
a one-sided argument. 
 . . . . 
 
Mr. Hewitt: I think you indicated earlier that you would lean 
a little -- 
 
Juror 251:   Well, at this point I would have to be [a] liar if 
I said to you -- the facts that I had lean in 
favor of the possibility or the possibility of it 
happening.  I haven't really had any, a lot of 
facts thrown to me, where it is not, and like I 
said, I would have to hear what they have to say, 
and determine from that.  I just can't crystal-
ball, say this gentleman is going to convince me 
that the client, his client did die from it.  I 
just have to listen to the facts, and just 
understand all the facts that I had about it have 
been the negative, from your standpoint, so I 
would have to weed out one or the other. 
 
App. at 76-79. 
  
course of their work lives; (5) he admitted in the first instance 
that he was leaning in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
asbestos company; (6) he believed that he was "probably high on 
the priority list" of getting an asbestos-related disease 
himself; and (7) he knew "a lot of [union] members" who 
presumably had asbestos-related medical problems. 
 Owens-Corning next argues that prospective juror # 45 
should have been struck for cause because he had responded to the 
jury questionnaire that he could not be fair and later repeated 
at voir dire that he would have a difficult time being fair to 
the defendant.  Kirk counters by pointing out that when further 
questioned by the district court as to whether he could render a 
fair and impartial verdict, the prospective juror responded in 
the affirmative.4  Again, we are troubled because the second 
                     
4
.  Relevant portions of the voir dire are as follows: 
 
The Court: In this case, sir, if you are on this jury can you 
well and truly try the case based on the evidence 
as it comes forth from the witness stand and not, 
with all respects [sic] to the media, based on TV, 
or radio or newspapers and all of that?  Do you 
think you could do that, sir? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes, I believe so, because it's possible it could 
be slanted one way or the other. 
 . . . . 
 
The Court:   So you answered that you could not be fair to 
companies that made, distributed, supplied and/or 
installed asbestos-containing products, what do 
you mean by that? 
 
Juror 45:   Basically I feel it's sort of immoral to knowingly 
produce something you know is going to cause a 
problem. 
 
  
prospective juror: (1) stated in the jury questionnaire that he 
could not be fair to companies that made, distributed, supplied 
and/or installed asbestos-containing products; (2) felt it was 
immoral to produce asbestos if the company knew it was going to 
cause a problem; and (3) indicated that he could not be fair to 
(..continued) 
The Court:  Do you think it's immoral -- I am not saying this 
is the case -- to produce something when they 
don't know anything is wrong with it, they don't 
know but it turns out later there is something 
wrong with it? 
 
Juror 45:   I feel if they do find out it should be corrected. 
 . . . . 
  
The Court:   [D]o you think you could be fair? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes. 
 
Mr. Hewitt:   One question, if the evidence is that Owens 
Corning knew that asbestos was hazardous would you 
have a tough time giving them a fair shake? 
 
Juror 45:   Yes, I would. 
 
The Court:   What do you mean by giving them a fair shake?  
Would you have a tough time coming up with a 
verdict in their favor if you know the [sic] under 
the evidence and the law they are liable? 
 
Juror 45:   Well -- 
 
The Court:   I would tell you if it comes in, if the evidence 
and the law did not demonstrate that the plaintiff 
proved their [sic] case, I am not saying that is 
not being fair to the defendant, you are being 
fair, just as you would be fair to the plaintiff 
if after fairly considering the evidence you find 
there's not a case made out, you would 
nevertheless find against her, you are abiding by 
your oath as a juror. 
 
Juror 45:   Whatever you say, yes. 
 
App. at 64-66. 
  
the defendant if the evidence indicated that Owens-Corning knew 
that asbestos was hazardous.  Only after being repeatedly asked 
if he could be fair, the juror answered, "Whatever you say, yes." 
 Recently, we had the opportunity to decide a similar 
case involving a challenge to a district court's refusal to 
remove several jurors for cause.  Polan, 970 F.2d at 1284.  In 
that case, which involved a prosecution for conspiracy to 
distribute and the distribution of illegally prescribed drugs, 
counsel for the defendant challenged for cause three prospective 
jurors who revealed during voir dire that either they or members 
of their families were victims of drug abuse.  Id.  Juror #1 
revealed that one of his brothers had died of a drug overdose and 
another brother had served a lengthy prison term for drug 
offenses.  Id. n.2.  Juror # 2 indicated that she had become 
dependent upon tranquilizers after experiencing a family tragedy.  
Id.  Juror # 3 revealed that his son had abused alcohol and drugs 
in the past.  Id.  However, all three prospective jurors 
ultimately assured the court that their past experiences would 
not affect their decision making and that they would be fair and 
impartial.  After reviewing the record of the voir dire, we 
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to strike those prospective jurors.  Polan, 970 F.2d at 
1284.  
 We find that Polan is distinguishable from the case 
before us.  In Polan, the defendant wanted the prospective jurors 
removed presumably because he believed that some of their past 
experiences would make them more likely to vote for conviction.  
  
With regard to juror # 1, we gave little weight to the theory 
that an individual whose one brother died of a drug overdose and 
whose other brother served a prison sentence for drug offenses 
would be more likely to convict a criminal defendant charged with 
drug distribution.  With regard to juror # 2, we were not 
convinced that a person who became dependent on sedatives after 
the shock of a family tragedy would be more likely to convict an 
individual accused of distributing drugs.  Finally, with regard 
to juror # 3, we gave little credence to the notion that a father 
who endured his son's alcohol and drug problems would be biased 
in favor of the prosecution.  Thus, when the district court in 
Polan credited the assurances of the three prospective jurors, it 
implicitly made two findings: (1) that the jurors were telling 
the truth and (2) despite the experiences and personal biases of 
the jurors, they could be fair and impartial, precisely because 
their past experiences and personal biases did not make them more 
likely to convict the defendant. 
 Here, Owens-Corning objected to jurors # 251 and # 45 
being seated on the jury because it believed that their personal 
biases regarding asbestos and asbestos companies would make them 
more likely to return a finding of liability and a large damage 
award against Owens-Corning.  Unlike the defendant in Polan, 
Owens-Corning's fear, that the prospective witnesses' past 
experiences and personal biases would affect their decision, was 
well-founded. 
 Juror # 251 inhaled a considerable amount of asbestos, 
knew people who were suffering from asbestos-related diseases, 
  
and thought himself likely to succumb to some asbestos-related 
disease in the future.  Thus, there was good reason to conclude 
that he would be more likely to return a large damage award 
because he sympathized with the plaintiff.  See Gumbs v. Pueblo 
International, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A] 
jur[or] may not abandon analysis for sympathy for a suffering 
plaintiff and treat an injury as though it were a winning lottery 
ticket.").  It is difficult to conceive of a juror who would be 
more partial to this plaintiff than juror # 251.  Because juror # 
251's background is replete with circumstances which would call 
into question his ability to be fair to an asbestos manufacturer, 
we find that it was improper to allow him to serve on the jury. 
 Juror # 45 stated that he was biased against asbestos 
companies and felt it was immoral knowingly to produce harmful 
and defective products.  The danger existed that this juror would 
return a verdict of liability against Owens-Corning even if 
Owens-Corning's products were not responsible for the decedent's 
injuries.  We can think of few admissions more compelling in 
asbestos litigation than a prospective juror who acknowledges 
that he would have moral qualms about being fair to an asbestos 
manufacturer. 
 We conclude that juror # 45 and especially juror # 251 
could not serve fairly and impartially in light of their past 
experiences and personal biases.  The district court relied too 
heavily on the jurors' assurances of impartiality, and therefore 
abused its discretion.  A district court's refusal to excuse a 
juror will not automatically be upheld simply because the 
  
district court ultimately elicits from the prospective juror that 
he will be fair and impartial, despite earlier statements or 
circumstances to the contrary.  The application of Owens-Corning 
to dismiss these two jurors for cause should have been granted.  
The jury was not fairly and impartially constituted, and 
accordingly we will order a new trial. 
 
 III.  Prior Testimony of Out of Court Witness 
 During the liability phase of the trial, Owens-Corning 
offered the expert testimony of Dr. Harry Demopoulos to prove 
that the overwhelming majority of asbestos-induced mesotheliomas 
are caused by crocidolite asbestos fiber.  This testimony 
supported Owens-Corning's defense that its product, Kaylo, which 
did not contain crocidolite fiber, could not have caused the 
decedent's mesothelioma.  Over Owens-Corning's objection, Kirk 
was permitted to read to the jury the prior trial testimony of 
Dr. Louis Burgher from an unrelated New Jersey State Court 
asbestos action in 1992.  In that case, Dr. Burgher had been an 
expert witness for Owens-Corning and testified on cross-
examination that it was possible for mesothelioma to be caused by 
chrysotile fibers contaminated with tremolite.  Kirk was clearly 
attempting to discredit Owens-Corning's defense offered through 
Dr. Demopoulos by revealing to the jury that Owens-Corning's 
expert witness in a previous case voiced a different and 
contradictory opinion as to which asbestos fibers cause 
mesothelioma.  After the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Kirk, Owens-Corning made a post-trial motion for a new trial 
  
based in part on the alleged admission of hearsay evidence, i.e., 
the prior testimony of Dr. Burgher in an unrelated case.  The 
district court denied this motion. 
 Normally, when a new trial is sought by reason of a 
district court's alleged error in allowing the introduction of 
evidence, we review for abuse of discretion.  Lippay v. Christos, 
996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 
788 F.2d 918, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1986)).  However, where as here the 
ruling on admissibility of hearsay evidence implicates the 
application of a legally set standard, our review is plenary.  
Id.; see also United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 332 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
allowing the jury to hear this evidence in light of the fact that 
it was hearsay.  Although the record is at best vague as to what 
the district court's basis was for allowing such testimony, Kirk 
attempts to justify its admission under two distinct theories -- 
either the testimony was not hearsay pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence or it was hearsay, 
but subject to an exception pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1).5 
 
 A.  Rule 801(d)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
                     
5
.  Alternatively, Kirk argues that assuming arguendo it was 
error to admit the testimony of Dr. Burgher, it was harmless 
error because the weight of the medical testimony of Kirk's other 
witnesses was overwhelming.  In light of our decision to remand 
for a new trial because the jury was improperly constituted, we 
need not address whether any evidentiary errors may be harmless. 
  
 Kirk first attempts to justify the district court's 
admission of the prior trial testimony of Dr. Burgher by arguing 
it is an admission by a party opponent since it is a statement by 
a person authorized by Owens-Corning to speak concerning 
mesothelioma and is thus not hearsay.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(C)6; see also Precision Piping v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours, 951 F.2d 613, 619 (4th Cir. 1991) (authority in the 
context of 801(d)(2)(C) means "authority to speak" on a 
particular subject on behalf of someone else).  In her brief, 
Kirk argues that Dr. Burgher was authorized by Owens-Corning to 
offer his expert opinion about medical literature regarding 
mesothelioma and fiber type.  Appellee's Brief at 21.  At oral 
argument, Kirk suggested that the testimony of any expert that 
Owens-Corning has previously used in a trial can be used in 
future litigation against it as an authorized admission. 
 In support of this proposition, Kirk cites Collins v. 
Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1980), which held that 
deposition testimony of an expert employed by a bus manufacturer 
to investigate an accident was an admission under 801(d)(2)(C).  
However, in that case the court made a finding that the expert 
                     
6
.  Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in 
relevant part: 
 
 (d) Statements which are not hearsay.  A statement is 
not hearsay if -- 
 (2) Admission by party-opponent.  The statement is 
offered against a party and is . . . 
 (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
  
witness was an agent of the defendant and the defendant employed 
the expert to investigate and analyze the bus accident.  Id.  The 
court determined that in giving his deposition, the expert was 
performing the function that the manufacturer had employed him to 
perform.  As such, the court concluded that the expert's report 
of his investigation and his deposition testimony in which he 
explained his analysis and investigation was an admission of the 
defendant.  Id.; see also Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
Inc., 742 F.2d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Collins v. Wayne 
Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1980)) (explaining that 
Collins holds that "an agent's statement, made within the scope 
of his authority . . . is admissible against the principal as an 
admission").   
 Kirk misconstrues the entire premise of calling expert 
witnesses.  In theory, despite the fact that one party retained 
and paid for the services of an expert witness, expert witnesses 
are supposed to testify impartially in the sphere of their 
expertise.  Thus, one can call an expert witness even if one 
disagrees with the testimony of the expert.  Rule 801(d)(2)(C) 
requires that the declarant be an agent of the party-opponent 
against whom the admission is offered, and this precludes the 
admission of the prior testimony of an expert witness where, as 
normally will be the case, the expert has not agreed to be 
subject to the client's control in giving his or her testimony.  
See Sabel v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Mass 
1990).  Since an expert witness is not subject to the control of 
the party opponent with respect to consultation and testimony he 
  
or she is hired to give, the expert witness cannot be deemed an 
agent.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. a (1958) 
("The relation of agency is created as the result of conduct by 
two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for the other 
to act for him subject to his control, and that the other 
consents so to act.") 
 Because an expert witness is charged with the duty of 
giving his or her expert opinion regarding the matter before the 
court, we fail to comprehend how an expert witness, who is not an 
agent of the party who called him, can be authorized to make an 
admission for that party.7  See Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6722, at 502 (Interim Edition 
1992) (the authority of the agent to speak as to a subject must 
be established at trial).  We are unwilling to adopt the 
proposition that the testimony of an expert witness who is called 
to testify on behalf of a party in one case can later be used 
against that same party in unrelated litigation, unless there is 
a finding that the expert witness is an agent of the party and is 
authorized to speak on behalf of that party.  Accordingly, we 
find Dr. Burgher's prior trial testimony to be hearsay in the 
context of the present trial. 
 
                     
7
.  In the case before us, unlike Collins, there was no explicit 
finding on the record that Dr. Burgher was an agent of the 
defendant.  To the extent that Collins holds that an expert 
witness who is hired to testify on behalf of a party is 
automatically an agent of that party who called him and 
consequently his testimony can be admitted as non-hearsay in 
future proceedings, we reject this rule. 
  
 B.  Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence   
 Because the testimony of Dr. Burgher is hearsay, we 
must next inquire whether it falls within any of the hearsay 
exceptions enumerated in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Kirk 
argues that Dr. Burgher's testimony falls within the former 
testimony hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(1).  In order for 
former testimony to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay 
rule: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) testimony must 
be taken at a hearing, deposition, or civil action or proceeding; 
and (3) the party against whom the testimony is now offered must 
have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(5), (b)(1).8  Because Dr. Burgher testified in open 
                     
8
.  Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part: 
 
(b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 
(1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another 
hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in a deposition 
taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). 
 
"Unavailability" is defined in Rule 804 as follows: 
 
(a) Definition of unavailability.  "Unavailability as a witness" 
includes situations in which the declarant -- 
 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance . . . by 
process or other reasonable means. 
 
  
court during the state court action, no one disputes that the 
second element has been satisfied. 
 Regarding the first element, we note that it is an 
abuse of discretion for a district court to admit former 
testimony into evidence under Rule 804(b)(1) without a finding of 
unavailability.  See O'Banion v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 
968 F.2d 1011, 1014 (10th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its 
discretion in admitting former testimony of expert where there 
was no showing of unavailability).  Because there was no finding 
on the record as to unavailability, if the district court based 
admitting this testimony on Rule 804(b)(1), we hold that the 
district court abused its discretion in allowing this former 
testimony into evidence. 
 Normally, our inquiry would end here after determining 
that former testimony cannot be admitted absent specific findings 
of unavailability.  However, because of the likelihood that an 
offer may be made during the retrial of this matter to admit this 
testimony as former testimony, we believe further discussion is 
warranted. 
 We observe that it is the proponent of the statement 
offered under Rule 804 who bears the burden of proving the 
unavailability of the declarant.  United States v. Eufracio-
Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1008, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 65, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (1980)); 2 John William 
(..continued) 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (emphasis supplied). 
  
Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 253, at 134 (4th ed. 1992) 
("The proponent of the hearsay statement must . . . show that the 
witness cannot be found").  We can find nothing in the record 
which indicates any "reasonable means" employed by Kirk to 
procure the services of Dr. Burgher so that he might testify at 
trial.  See McCormick § 253, at 134 (mere absence of the 
declarant, standing alone, does not establish unavailability); 
see also Moore v. Mississippi Valley State University, 871 F.2d 
545, 552 (5th Cir. 1989) (deposition inadmissible in civil trial 
where no evidence to establish unavailability offered). 
 Kirk claims that Dr. Burgher, who is a resident of 
Nebraska, was beyond her ability to subpoena and was thus 
unavailable.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).9  However, 
Kirk made no independent attempt to contact Dr. Burgher, offer 
him his usual expert witness fee, and request his attendance at 
trial.10  Because Dr. Burgher was never even as much as 
                     
9
.  Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
relevant part: 
 
(c) Protection of Persons Subject to Subpoenas. 
   (3)(A) On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was 
issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it -- 
         (ii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer 
of a party to travel to a place more than 100 miles from the 
place where that person resides, is employed or regularly 
transacts business in person . . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).   
10
.  At oral argument, Kirk argued that it was the responsibility 
of Owens-Corning to locate and contact Dr. Burgher and establish 
his availability because the district court requested Owens-
Corning to determine whether he would be available to testify.  
To the extent that the district court placed the burden on Owens-
Corning to establish the unavailability of Dr. Burgher, the 
  
contacted, Kirk has failed to prove that she used "reasonable 
means" to enlist his services. 
 We next address whether Owens-Corning had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony of Dr. 
Burgher at the prior unrelated state court trial.11  The 
similarity of motive requirement assures "that the earlier 
treatment of the witness is the rough equivalent of what the 
party against whom the statement is offered would do at trial if 
the witness were available to be examined by that party."  United 
States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 2 
Steven A. Saltzburg & Michael M. Martin, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual 400 (5th ed. 1990) ("The way to determine whether 
or not motives are similar is to look at the similarity of the 
issues and the context in which the opportunity for examination 
previously arose."). 
(..continued) 
district court made an error of law in shifting the burden of 
proof.  Kirk then articulated what we term a "convenience" 
argument, that is, she argued that Dr. Burgher was Owens-
Corning's expert and Owens-Corning was in a better position to 
locate Dr. Burgher because it had Dr. Burgher's telephone number.  
To the extent that Kirk is advocating that Owens-Corning should 
undertake the task of locating a witness for Kirk so that she may 
use that testimony against Owens-Corning, we reject any such 
notion.  For the same reasons we protect an attorney's work 
product from discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S. Ct. 385, 394 (1947) 
("Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably 
develop . . . .  The effect on the legal system would be 
demoralizing.  And the interests of the clients and the cause of 
justice would be poorly served."), we do not believe that Owens-
Corning had any duty to assist Kirk in preparing her case. 
11
.  Again, although we need not reach this issue absent a 
finding of unavailability, because of the likelihood that an 
offer may be made during the retrial to admit this evidence as 
former testimony, we believe further discussion is warranted. 
  
 There was no finding by the district court that Owens-
Corning had an opportunity and similar motive to examine Dr. 
Burgher.  Further, during oral argument, counsel for Kirk 
indicated that the only document before the district court from 
the state court trial was the transcript of Dr. Burgher's 
testimony.  The district court did not have the complaint, 
answer, or jury charge from the state court proceedings.  Thus, 
even if the district court had attempted to make a finding as to 
opportunity and similar motive, it would have been unable to 
reach a well-reasoned conclusion based on the information before 
the district court.12  See McCormick § 304, at 317 (courts must 
look to the operative issue in the earlier proceeding).  
Accordingly, we must conclude that Kirk failed to prove that 
Owens-Corning had an opportunity and similar motive to examine 
Dr. Burgher. 
 
 
   IV. Introduction of Interrogatory of Settled Co-
Defendant 
 Kirk settled the instant action with Garlock and 
several other defendants prior to trial.  At trial, Owens-Corning 
                     
12
.  For instance, the statement elicited from Dr. Burgher during 
cross-examination at the state trial may not have warranted 
redirect by Owens-Corning in light of its theory of defense.  See 
McCormick § 302, at 307 ("Circumstances may differ sufficiently 
between the prior hearing and the present trial to bar admission 
. . . as where questions on a particular subject would have been 
largely irrelevant at the earlier proceeding.").  Because we do 
not have the pleadings, we cannot determine whether an 
opportunity and similar motive existed.   
  
sought in its cross-claim to prove that the decedent was exposed 
to products made by Garlock.  If the jury were to conclude that 
the decedent's injuries had been caused in whole or part by 
exposure to Garlock products, then Owens-Corning could eliminate 
or substantially reduce its liability.  Conversely, it was in 
Kirk's financial interest to prove that the decedent was exposed 
to only Owens-Corning products.  In an effort to rebut the 
testimony of an Owens-Corning witness who testified that Garlock 
gaskets were present in the New York shipyard during the years 
that the decedent worked there, Kirk read into evidence an 
interrogatory response which was prepared and filed by Garlock in 
defense of this action.  Of course, at the time this 
interrogatory was read to the jury, Garlock was no longer a party 
to this lawsuit.  Specifically, counsel for Kirk read the 
following statement to the jury: 
 Since Garlock products are bonded and/or 
encapsulated and treated in such a manner 
that they do not, when used in the manner for 
which they were intended, emit meaningful 
levels of asbestos dust and fibers, no 
restrictions or limitations on use are 
necessary. 
App. at 513.  In response to Owens-Corning's closing remarks, 
counsel for Kirk reminded the jury: 
 I read you from the Garlock interrogatory, 
Garlock product is bonded, encapsulated, it 
does not emit dust. 
App. at 545. 
 Owens-Corning argues that the district court erred in 
admitting this interrogatory response because the interrogatory 
  
answer was pure hearsay.  Kirk attempts to justify the admission 
of this interrogatory response under the catch-all or residual 
exception, Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.13  As 
stated previously, our standard of review is plenary where the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence "implicates the application of 
a legally set standard."  See supra part III. 
 As a preliminary matter, we note that the plain 
language of the rule requires the proponent of the hearsay 
statement to put the adverse party on notice that the proponent 
intends to introduce the statement into evidence.  We have 
interpreted this to mean that the proponent must give notice of 
the hearsay statement itself as well as the proponent's intention 
specifically to rely on the rule as a grounds for admissibility 
                     
13
.  Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part: 
 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
 . . . 
 
Other exceptions.  A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules 
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of 
the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial 
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) (emphasis added).  
  
of the hearsay statement.  United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 
193, 202 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 
558, 574 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Even assuming arguendo that Owens-
Corning was on notice that Kirk intended to introduce this 
evidence at trial, we observe from the record that Kirk never 
gave notice to Owens-Corning that she intended to introduce this 
evidence under Rule 803(24).  App. at 512.  We recognize that the 
advance notice requirement of Rule 803(24) can be met where the 
proponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to notify 
his adversary and the trial judge has offered sufficient time, by 
means of granting a continuance, for the opponent to prepare to 
contest its admission.  See United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 
341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (the purposes of the rule and the 
requirement of fairness are satisfied under such circumstances).  
Because of the lack of notice by Kirk that she intended to rely 
on Rule 803(24) and the lack of a showing by Kirk as to why it 
was not possible to provide Owens-Corning with notice, the 
district court erred in admitting this evidence at trial. 
 Turning to the substance of the rule itself, we note 
that in order for the hearsay statement to be admitted, it must 
have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."  
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24); see also Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6775, at 737-39 (Interim 
Edition 1992) (factors bearing on trustworthiness include the 
declarant's partiality, i.e., interest or bias).  Owens-Corning 
argues that the interrogatories of Garlock lack trustworthiness 
and are self-serving.  Kirk submits that the interrogatory 
  
answers are trustworthy because they are signed and sworn under 
penalty of perjury.14  We find that an interrogatory response of 
a co-defendant who is seeking to avoid liability lacks the 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that are 
contemplated by Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
Garlock had every incentive to set forth the facts in a light 
most favorable to itself, while at the same time still answering 
the interrogatories truthfully.  See United States v. DeLuca, 692 
F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (excluding statement under 
residual hearsay exception because of motive to exculpate oneself 
after indictment or investigation).  Using these interrogatory 
responses to prove that Garlock products could not have caused 
the decedent's illness without the opportunity for cross-
examination implicates many of the dangers the hearsay rule is 
designed to prevent.  Accordingly, the district court erred in 
admitting this evidence. 
   
 V.  Delay Damages   
 Finally, Owens-Corning argues that it was improper as a 
matter of law for the district court to award delay damages to 
the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
                     
14
.  There is nothing in the record to indicate that the district 
court made any findings as to the reliability of the Garlock 
interrogatories.  See United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 
990, 1000 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring specific findings regarding 
the requisite elements of Rule 803(24)); United States v. 
Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 1990) (district 
court must find that the statements met the requirements of the 
rule in order for the appellate court to consider the 
admissibility of the statement under 803(24)). 
  
Civil Procedure because it is a procedural rule and should not be 
applied by federal courts sitting in diversity.  Owens-Corning 
argues in the alternative that even if it is permissible for a 
federal court sitting in diversity to award delay damages 
pursuant to Rule 238, it was improper here because: (1) the 
entire delay was caused by the plaintiff's strategic decision to 
file simultaneous federal and state court actions and her failure 
to request a remand of the federal action from the multidistrict 
docket when settlement negotiations reached an impasse and (2) 
the district court miscalculated the damage award in failing to 
account for a delay of approximately two years that was caused by 
a judicial stay imposed by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  
Owens-Corning maintains that because it was not responsible for 
the delay, it should not be required to pay delay damages for 
that period. 
 
 A.  Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
 Procedure -- Substantive or Procedural? 
       
 First, we must address Owens-Corning's argument that a 
federal court sitting in diversity cannot apply Rule 238 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure because it is a procedural 
rather than a substantive rule.  Yet, ultimately, Owens-Corning 
concedes, as it must, that this question has already been decided 
by this Court in Fauber v. Kem Transportation and Equipment Co., 
876 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1989).  In that case, we held that Rule 238 
is substantive and must be followed by federal courts sitting in 
diversity cases.  Id. at 328.  Counsel is thus implicitly asking 
  
this panel to overrule Fauber.  We note that this Court's 
Internal Operating Procedures prohibit a panel of this Court from 
overruling a published opinion of a previous panel.  See Internal 
Operating Procedure Rule 9.1 ("[T]he holding of a panel in a 
reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.").  Because we 
are bound by Fauber, and in any event do not question its wisdom, 
we reiterate that it is proper for a federal district court 
sitting in diversity to award delay damages to a plaintiff under 
Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
 B.  Did Plaintiff Cause Delay? 
 Second, Owens-Corning maintains that Kirk was 
responsible for the delay because she filed simultaneous federal 
and state court actions and additionally failed to make an 
application to remand the federal action from the multidistrict 
docket when settlement negotiations proved fruitless. 
 Our review of the applicability of Rule 238 in a 
diversity case is plenary.  Fauber, 876 F.2d at 329.  Rule 238 of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant 
part: 
    (a)(1) At the request of the plaintiff in 
a civil action seeking monetary relief for . 
. . death[,] . . . damages for delay shall be 
added to the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded against each defendant . . . found to 
be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of 
a jury . . . . 
       (2) Damages for delay shall be awarded 
for the period of time 
          (i) in an action commenced before 
August 1, 1989, from the date the plaintiff 
first filed a complaint or from a date one 
year after the accrual of the cause of 
  
action, whichever is later, up to the date of 
the . . . verdict . . . . 
       (3) Damages for delay shall be 
calculated at the rate equal to the prime 
rate as listed in the first edition of the 
Wall Street Journal published for each 
calendar year for which the damages are 
awarded, plus one percent, not compounded. 
    (b) The period of time for which damages 
for delay shall be calculated under 
subdivision (a)(2) shall exclude the period 
of time, if any, 
       (1) after which the defendant has made 
a written offer of 
          (i) settlement in a specified sum 
with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff, or 
          (ii) a structured settlement 
underwritten by a financially responsible 
entity, and continued that offer in effect 
for at least ninety days or until 
commencement of trial, whichever first 
occurs, which offer was not accepted and the 
plaintiff did not recover by award, verdict 
or decision, exclusive of damages for delay, 
more than 125 percent of either the specified 
sum or the actual cost of the structured 
settlement plus any cash payment to the 
plaintiff; or 
       (2) during which the plaintiff caused 
delay of the trial. 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 238 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 According to the plain language of the rule, a 
defendant must pay delay damages unless the delay falls within 
the excludable time as set forth in the rule.  Owens-Corning 
concedes that it did not make a settlement offer which would 
satisfy the rule.  Thus, the only other way for the defendant to 
be relieved from paying delay damages would be if the plaintiff 
caused the delay. 
 According to Owens-Corning, but for the plaintiff's 
strategic decision to file a federal asbestos action, the matter 
  
could have been resolved long ago in state court.  Here, Kirk 
would have been forced to abandon her remedy in federal court and 
seek relief only in the state forum.  To adopt the rule of law as 
advocated by Owens-Corning, we would be required to hold that 
delay is per se attributable to a plaintiff anytime a plaintiff 
files a diversity action in federal court when a suitable state 
forum exists.  Nothing in Rule 238 contemplates that a plaintiff 
must forgo any rights in order to be entitled to delay damages, 
and we are unwilling to adopt such a proposition. 
 In support of its argument that Kirk was responsible 
for the delay in failing to request a remand from the 
multidistrict docket, Owens-Corning relies on Babich v. 
Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co., 386 Pa. Super. 482, 563 
A.2d 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).  In that case, the plaintiff's 
motion for delay damages pursuant to Rule 238 was denied by the 
trial court and plaintiff appealed.  Babich, 386 Pa. Super. at 
487, 563 A.2d at 171.  In assessing who was responsible for the 
almost seven year delay between the commencement of suit and the 
jury verdict, the court observed: 
 [T]he chief reasons for delay in this case 
cannot be attributed to defendants.  [One of 
the defendants] filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in federal court six months after 
[plaintiff's] complaint was filed and 
[plaintiff] did not successfully obtain 
relief from the automatic stay until 
approximately two years and four months later 
despite cooperation from counsel for the 
bankruptcy and counsel for the insurance 
company.  The other primary delay in the case 
was [plaintiff's] failure to place the case 
at issue in a speedy fashion.  [Plaintiff] 
fails to point to any delay attributable to 
  
defendants and we find none upon review of 
the record. 
Babich, 386 Pa. Super. at 487, 563 A.2d at 171. 
 Owens-Corning argues that because Kirk did not seek a 
remand from the multidistrict docket, she failed to obtain relief 
from the MDL stay just as the plaintiff in Babich failed to 
obtain relief from the automatic stay.  Owens-Corning's reliance 
on Babich is misplaced.  In that case plaintiff could have sought 
relief and moved the trial along, because opposing counsel was 
cooperating with and assisting counsel.  Here, however, according 
to Judge Weiner's Pretrial Order, the case could be remanded for 
trial only if there was a finding that the defendant was acting 
in bad faith during the settlement negotiations.  To the extent 
that Owens-Corning is found to have acted in bad faith, this 
would militate against a finding that delay was caused by the 
plaintiff. 
 
 C.  Is Delay Not Caused By Defendant Excludable?      
 Third, Owens-Corning argues that because the delay was 
caused by the MDL Order, it offends traditional notions of fair 
play and due process to make a defendant pay for another's delay.  
Owens-Corning asks that the award of delay damages be 
recalculated and further maintains that it is unconstitutional to 
impose delay damages on it for this time period because it was 
never acting in bad faith and the delay was caused by the court.  
Were we to adopt the rule of law as articulated by Owens-Corning, 
we would have to redraft Rule 238(b)(2) to state "during which 
  
the defendant did not cause the delay of the trial," instead of 
"during which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial."  We are 
not so inclined and we find that the plaintiff caused no delay of 
the trial. 
 Owens-Corning also argues that notwithstanding the 
language of the rule, requiring it to pay for delay caused by the 
judiciary is a violation of due process.  Owens-Corning fails to 
comprehend the theory underlying Rule 238.  Delay damages merely 
compensate a plaintiff for money that he or she would have earned 
on the award if he or she had promptly received it.  Costa v. 
Lauderdale Beach Hotel, 534 Pa. 154, 160, 626 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. 
1993).  The rule also functions to prevent a defendant from being 
unjustly enriched by keeping interest that could be earned during 
the litigation process on what is essentially the plaintiff's 
money.  Id. n.6.  We find no merit to Owens-Corning's argument 
that delay damages violate due process in this instance.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision to 
award delay damages to the plaintiff.   
 
 VI. Conclusion 
 The seating of two jurors in this matter was error, as 
was allowing into evidence the prior testimony of a witness in an 
unrelated state court trial and permitting the introduction into 
evidence of an answer to an interrogatory by a settled co-
defendant.  We will reverse the judgment of the district court 
and remand the matter to the district court for a new trial.  
Costs taxed against appellees.        
  
 
                         
